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A key assumption in many studies examining valuation of reward is that participants’ 
preferences for various rewards are meaningfully, monotonically ordered with respect to other 
possible rewards. However, this assumption has not been systematically tested. Two studies 
consisting of 74 undergraduates from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas and 122 community 
members demonstrated nonmonotonic reward preferences when provided with parametrically 
varied reward magnitudes. Although deficits in reward processing are believed to be a key 
feature of depression, depressed participants were more willing to work hard for rewards and 
exhibited more monotonic reward preferences than non-depressed participants. Relative to 
imaginary rewards, participants were more willing to work for real money and spent more time 
making decisions when there was a possibility of earning real money.  
iv 
Table of Contents 
Abstract iii 
List of Figures v 
Chapter 1: Literature Review 1 
Chapter 2 Current Studies 10 
Chapter 3 Method 12 
Chapter 4 Data Analysis 17 
Chapter 5 Discussion 33 
References 41 
Curriculum Vitae 48 
v 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Choices of undergraduates by absolute differences 19 
Figure 2. Reaction times of undergraduates by absolute differences 20 
Figure 3. Choices of undergraduates by relative ratio 22 
Figure 4. Reaction times of undergraduates by relative ratio 23 
Figure 5. Choices of depressed and control participants by absolute difference 27 
Figure 6. Reaction times of depressed and control participants by absolute difference 29 
Figure 7. Choices of depressed and control participants by relative ratio 31 
Figure 8. Reaction times of depressed and control participants by relative ratio 32 
1	
Chapter 1: Literature Review 
The degree to which people are willing to work harder for larger rewards is an important 
measure to consider when studying individual differences in “wanting”. It is typically believed 
that individuals display greater wanting and are willing to work harder for larger, more 
meaningful rewards. As a result, a key assumption in many studies examining valuation of 
reward is that participants’ preferences for various rewards are meaningfully, monotonically 
ordered with respect to other possible rewards (Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, & Zald, 2012; 
Treadway, Buckholtz, Schwartzman, Lambert, & Zald, 2009; Franzen & Brinkmann, 2015). 
However, this assumption has not been systematically tested. If this assumption is not correct, it 
limits the certainty of the conclusions that one can make in regards to studies operating under the 
assumption. The current study attempts to standardize previous studies examining reward 
processing by providing parametrically varied reward magnitudes. Additionally, previous studies 
have not examined how absolute and relative reward differences affect choice behavior or 
decision response times. The new information provided by the current study aims to identify 
differences between normative and depressed reward processing to help better understand the 
features of depression and guide future studies.  
The current studies examine calculated reward preferences amongst pairs of monetary 
rewards that differ in magnitude and required effort. These preferences are examined in 
undergraduate students, community members with depression, and community members without 
depression. As previously noted, there is a disparity of research in regards to the general 
population’s reward preferences. Additionally, previous research on reward preferences of 
individuals with depression have focused on their non-calculated, “gut”, reactions to rewards 
rather than their ability to reason amongst different possible rewards (Treadway et al., 2009). 
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Cognitive Biases, Reward Types, and Reward Valuation 
Reward valuation does not exist in a vacuum independent of factors outside the reward 
itself. Several factors influence and may distort the valuation of a reward’s magnitude relative to 
other available rewards. For instance, numerical biases can interfere with an individual’s ability 
to accurately assign value to a monetary reward when given a choice of multiple monetary 
rewards. One of these biases is the whole number bias. The whole number bias refers to 
comparing the whole number components of fractions rather than the entire fractions themselves, 
therefore making an individual more likely to believe 1/8 is larger than 1/2 because 8 is larger 
than 2 or that 7/10 is larger than 4/5 because 7 is larger than 4. Though this phenomenon was 
originally studied in children, adults have been shown to exhibit this bias as well (DeWolf & 
Vosniadou, 2015). The whole number bias is so influential that even expert mathematicians, 
defined as individuals with a Master’s level math degree or higher, exhibit the bias when the 
fractions being compared share either a common numerator or common denominator 
(Obersteiner, Van Dooren, Van Hoof, & Verschaffel, 2013).  
Another bias that interferes with accurate monetary valuation is the distance effect. The 
distance effect refers to the tendency for more errors in quantity judgment to occur as the 
similarity in magnitude increases amongst the numbers being compared. For example, people are 
less likely to recognize that the number 44 is smaller than the number 51 than that the number 44 
is smaller than the number 67. In addition to the distance effect, the whole number bias becomes 
most prominent when the fractions being compared are very close in magnitude (DeWolf & 
Vosniadou, 2015). For example, people are less likely to recognize that 5/8 is less than 6/7. An 
exception to the distance effect is when decimal quantities are being compared; an increase in 
quantity judgment errors occurs as the orthographic similarity of decimals become more alike, 
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rather than their magnitude (Cohen, 2010). For example, a quantity judgment error is more likely 
to occur when comparing the values .325 and .352 than when comparing the values .325 and 
.348.  
Individuals’ overall math abilities impact their ability to precisely value monetary 
rewards. Jones, Price, and Randall (2011) found that college students commonly make errors in 
basic mathematics; such errors include fraction to percentage conversion, solving for missing 
values, basic arithmetic, and appropriate use of order of operations. Some of the difficulties 
involving basic mathematics may abate over time, as repeated exposure to the same math 
equations leads to a lesser error rate and a faster reaction time (Charness & Campbell, 1988). 
Therefore, valuation accuracy may be affected if the same reward choices are presented several 
times.   
 The nature of the potential reward affects one’s valuation of the reward. Imaginary 
rewards are often used in studies examining wanting due to resource constraints. Miyapuram, 
Tobler, Gregorios-Pippas, and Schultz (2012) demonstrated that participants rate imagined 
rewards and real rewards as equally pleasant. These findings suggest that both real and 
imaginary rewards share the same valuation systems. Additionally, both types of rewards display 
similar patterns of delay discounting. Therefore minimal difference should be observed between 
reward types even when the reward is not immediately administered (Johnson & Bickel, 2002). 
Nevertheless, caution is required when using imaginary rewards, as individual differences in 
delayed reward discounting may be dependent on one’s ability to imagine the reward accurately. 
Those who are able to represent the reward with greater vividness display less discounting over 
time (Hakimi & Hare, 2015).  
Cognition and Reward Valuation 
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 Reappraisal of a reward, a form of cognitive affect regulation, is associated with 
decreased pleasant anticipation, decreased reward seeking behavior, and decreased reward 
encoding (Staudinger, Erk, & Walter, 2011). When individuals generate value predictions 
associated with gains, the predictions are subsequently compared with actual outcomes to reveal 
potential prediction errors; observed prediction errors often result in an adjustment of valuation 
(Yacubian, Gläscher, Schroeder, Sommer, Braus, & Büchel, 2006).  
 Valuation is also affected by other current and past rewards. Although people may be 
presented with the same choice, different neural processes handle the method in which they 
process the choice. This is observed in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), a region of the brain 
associated with reward valuation; OFC neurons show increased activation for relative rewards, 
but not absolute rewards (Elliott, Agnew, & Deakin, 2008). When making a decision relative to 
other choices, individuals tend to accurately adjust their choice preference when information 
changes. By contrast, individuals who make decisions based on absolute values tend to not adjust 
their preferences when new information is provided (Teodorescu, Moran, & Usher, 2015). 
Although money is a secondary reward, a “common reward circuit” in the brain is activated by 
both primary and secondary rewards (Sescousse, Caldú, & Segura, 2013).  
 The Role of Effort in Reward Discounting and Overvaluation  
Another influence on reward valuation is reward discounting. Reward discounting refers 
to the tendency for individuals to attribute less value to a reward if it is not made immediately 
available. One situation in which discounting occurs is when a delay is present before receiving a 
reward. Humans tend to discount future rewards as a hyperbolic function: There is a steep 
discount when the delay is short, but as the length of time increases, the value decreases at a 
much slower rate (Johnson, Herrmann, & Johnson, 2015; Scheres, de Water, & Miles, 2013; Zarr 
5 
	
& Brown, 2014). Another factor is knowing the probability of obtaining a reward. As the 
probability of obtaining a reward decreases, the reward is discounted hyperbolically (Greenhow, 
Hunt, Macaskill, & Harper, 2015). Required physical effort also induces discounting. Humans 
tend to discount effort-based rewards parabolically: There is a small discount when minimal 
effort is required, but as the effort required increases, the value decreases at a much faster rate 
(Hartmann, Hager, Tobler, & Kaiser, 2013).  
Not all monetary rewards are discounted by effort at the same rate. Larger monetary 
amounts are discounted at a lesser rate than smaller amounts (Ostaszewski, Bąbel, & 
Swebodziński, 2013). When a reward is subjected to both a temporal delay and lesser 
probability, the discounting effects of both are multiplicative rather than additive (Vanderveldt, 
Green, & Myerson, 2015). However, when increased effort is required to obtain a reward, 
individuals attribute greater value to the reward (Ma, Meng, Wang, & Shen, 2014). Although 
individuals attribute greater value to rewards obtained through increased effort, they prefer easier 
tasks to obtain the same reward despite attributing less value to it (Alessandri, Darcheville, 
Delevoye-Turrell, & Zentall, 2008; Nishiyama, 2014). The increased valuation of rewards 
obtained after greater effort has been exerted is often explained as cognitive dissonance, or the 
justification effect; this phenomenon has been observed in human and nonhuman animals alike 
and is used to personally justify why a person has put forth increased effort (Klein, Bhatt, & 
Zentall, 2005). 
Effort’s effects on decision-making are also observable through individuals’ preferences. 
Individuals devalue effort-based rewards in a manner similar to delayed rewards (Prévost, 
Pessiglione, Météreau, Cléry-Melin, & Dreher, 2010). As a result, it is likely that individuals will 
stop valuing effort-based rewards much sooner than they would non-effort-based rewards. 
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Kurniawan, Guitart-Masip, Dayan, and Dolan (2013) used fMRI to demonstrate that individuals 
are sensitive to effort even when initially valuing rewards. Neural representations of anticipated 
actions respond to anticipated demands, but they are insensitive to anticipated values of rewards. 
Greater levels of effort results in a discount of outcome valuation, which aids in estimating a net 
value that considers both cost and benefit.  
Depression and Reward Processing 
Depression is a clinical state that entails substantial deficits in wanting and reward 
processing. Specifically, those diagnosed with major depressive disorder demonstrate less 
motivation to obtain possible rewards (Ubl, Kuehner, Kirsch, Ruttorf, Diener, & Flor, 2015; 
Whitton, Treadway, & Pizzagalli, 2015). Additionally, those diagnosed with depression 
demonstrate a lower heart rate in response to potential rewards and also report having less 
motivation to obtain rewards than healthy controls (Franzen & Brinkmann, 2015). 
Effort expenditure for rewards task. The Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task 
(EEfRT) is a measure of effort-based decision-making and reward valuation, allowing 
researchers to examine wanting in normal and clinical populations (Treadway et al., 2009). The 
task consists of multiple trials in which participants choose either an easy task for one dollar, or a 
hard task for amounts varying from 1.24 to 4.30 dollars. These widely varying amounts were 
chosen so that participants would not be likely to formally compute expected values for each 
choice during a trial. The easy task requires participants to press a button with the index finger of 
their dominant hand 30 times in 7 seconds; the hard task requires participants to press a button 
with the little finger of their non-dominant hand 100 times in 21 seconds. Participants are not 
guaranteed to win money on each trial, instead they are informed of the probability of winning 
the differing monetary amounts for each successful trial: 88%, 50%, or 12%. Once the monetary 
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values and probability are presented, participants are given 5 seconds to choose either the easy or 
the hard task. If a participant does not specify a choice, they are randomly assigned to one of the 
tasks. When each task begins, a bar fills with each button press to represent the participants’ 
progress towards reaching the required number of presses. After each trial, the participant is 
informed whether the trial was a success or failure. After the participant has engaged in the task 
for 20 minutes, two trials’ winnings are chosen based on the displayed probabilities, and 
participants are rewarded that amount.  
 The EEfRT was initially used to examine differences in wanting among individuals with 
anhedonia, but it has more recently been expanded to look at individuals with Major Depressive 
Disorder (MDD; Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, & Zald, 2012). The authors found that 
individuals with MDD chose the high effort, high reward tasks less often than individuals in the 
control group. Additionally, the MDD group showed less sensitivity to information regarding the 
magnitude of the rewards and the probabilities of receiving the rewards than the control group. 
Thus, in addition to having findings that are in agreement with the results of a memory task used 
by Franzen and Brinkmann (2015) that individuals with MDD demonstrate motivational deficits, 
Treadway et al. (2012) found that individuals with MDD also demonstrate decision-making 
deficits.  
Decision Making and Depressive Realism 
 Treadway et al.’s (2009) EEfRT was designed to explicitly emphasize gut-level decision 
making over calculated decision making by presenting non-parametric monetary pairs. Although 
the EEfRT gives a glimpse into potential differences in affective wanting, it does not allow for 
the examination of potential differences in planned decision-making.  
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 Depressive realism is a term that describes the tendency for individuals with Major 
Depressive Disorder to make more accurate inferences than individuals without Major 
Depressive Disorder (Moore & Fresco, 2012). Not all studies support depressive realism, Allan, 
Siegel, and Hannah (2007) explain the phenomenon as non-depressed individuals being overly 
optimistic when given information, whereas depressed individuals are more pessimistic and 
require more evidence before they believe something will occur. In regards to perceptual 
accuracy Moore and Fresco’s (2012) meta-analysis found a small effect of depressive realism 
across 75 studies.  
Depressive realism also has an effect on non-clinical populations in regards to time 
estimation. Those with higher scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), higher scores 
indicating higher levels of depressive symptomatology, demonstrated more accuracy when asked 
to estimate the amount of time passed from an initial point. Participants in this study consisted of 
non-clinically depressed college students. Previous studies have not found an effect of depressive 
realism on time estimation in clinical populations (Kornbrot & Grimwood, 2013).  
 Non-depressed and depressed individuals demonstrate differences in decision-making 
when making decisions regarding money, health, and interpersonal relationships for themselves 
versus others. (Garcia-Retamero, Okan, & Maldonado, 2015). Non-depressed individuals 
demonstrate a bias of making riskier decisions for themselves than they do for others. They also 
show a bias by predicting that others would make riskier decisions than they would make for 
themselves. Depressed individuals demonstrated a bias towards making less risky decisions for 
others than they would for themselves, but they did not demonstrate a bias when predicting 
others’ decisions (Garcia-Retamero, Okan, & Maldonado, 2015). The differences demonstrated 
between non-depressed and depressed individuals in regards to predicting others’ decisions 
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provide support for depressive realism in regards to money, health, and interpersonal 
relationships.  
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Chapter 2: Current Studies 
Study 1 
 The first study examined the assumption in previous studies that reward preferences are 
meaningfully and monotonically ordered using a modified EEfRT that is described below. I 
analyzed reward choices and reaction times of the choices of undergraduates who completed the 
task for imaginary monetary rewards. This pilot study was designed to better understand 
differences in absolute and relative reward valuation across time. 
Hypotheses 
Although there is some evidence, such as the above mentioned biases, that suggests the 
contrary, I predicted that participants’ choices would be monotonically and meaningfully 
ordered; participants would be more willing to exert greater effort as the discrepancy between 
monetary reward values increases. Additionally, participants would make faster decisions in 
regards to reward preference as they progress through the experiment due to their increased 
familiarity with the available choices.  
Study 2 
 The second study built on the first, using real monetary rewards to identify potential 
deficits in reward preferences of individuals with depression relative to healthy controls. 
Additionally, the second study allows for a comparison of reward preferences between imaginary 
and real monetary rewards when analyzed in regards to the first study. Specifically, I analyzed 





Once again although some phenomena, such as depressive realism, suggest the contrary, I 
predicted similar results to Treadway et al. (2009), such that depressed participants would make 
fewer accurate decisions in regards to reward magnitude than individuals with the control group; 
that is, unlike the control group, individuals in the depression group would not make 
monotonically ordered choices. Based on previous work, I also expected depressed participants 
to choose the hard task less frequently than control participants. Additionally, participants in 
both groups would make faster decisions in regards to reward preference as they progress 




Chapter 3: Method 
Study 1 
Participants 
Participants consisted of 74 (67% female) undergraduate students from the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas via the Sona system. The mean participant age was 21.2 years. In total, 
50.7% of participants were White, 16% were African American, 10.6% were Asian, 11.9% were 
Pacific Islander, and 5.3% identified as some other racial group; 29.3% of participants identified 
as Hispanic.  
Participants were excluded if they did not complete at least 50% of the trials (n = 1) or 
had a trial success rate below 60% across the entire experiment (n = 8) due to the task being 
designed to have a success rate of approximately 90%.  Individual trials were excluded (n = 11) 
if the choice reaction time for the trial was 2.5 standard deviations larger from a given 
participant’s mean reaction time. This left a total of 65 participants and 3,860 trials.  
Modified EEfRT 
 Before each trial, participants were given the option to engage in an easy trial for 
less money or a hard trial for more money. The fiscal pairs were as follows: $1.00 vs. $0.50, 
$1.50 vs. $0.50, $2.00 vs. $0.50, $4.00 vs. $0.50, $1.50 vs. $1.00, $2.00 vs. $1.00, $4.00 vs. 
$1.00, $2.00 vs. $1.50, $4.00 vs. $1.50, and $4.00 vs. $2.00. Participants encountered each 
choice six times throughout the experiment, for a total of 60 choice trials in the experiment. The 
order of the pairs that participants encountered were determined by a fixed run order that was 
dependent on their assigned participant number. There were also 30 “forced” trials interspersed 
throughout the experiment in which participants were presented with an easy or hard trial 
without being given a choice of which one they would like to engage in. The forced trials were 
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included to collect psychophysiological data in regards to specific levels of reward. Data from 
these trials were not analyzed here, as there was no choice that the participant made.  
Easy trials were completed by pressing either the number line 1 (for left-handed 
participants) or the number pad 5 (for right-handed participants) key 18 times in four seconds 
while using the index finger of their dominant hand. The hard trials were completed by pressing 
the opposite key 58 times in twelve seconds while using the little finger of their non-dominant 
hand. When each task began, an on-screen timer appeared and a bar would fill with each button 
press to represent the participants’ progress towards reaching the required number of presses. If 
the bar was completely filled before the timer reached zero, then the trial was considered 
successful.  
Besides using pairs of five fixed amounts that varied for both easy and hard tasks to 
examine choice strategies, we modified the orthodox EEfRT in three additional ways. We 
shortened the durations of both the easy and hard tasks to lessen the potential for fatigue. Our 
task lasted 30 minutes instead of 20 minutes to allow for collection of psychophysiological as 
well as behavioral data. Finally, we removed the probability manipulation to make the task easier 
for participants in anticipation of using it in less numerically adept community samples. 
Procedures 
Participants read and signed a consent form before being allowed to participate in the 
study. They were then informed that the money they could earn during the experiment was 
conceptual, and that they would receive no financial reward regardless of choices. Participants 
were provided with a computer keyboard and sat 100 cm away from a 19” LED monitor that 
displayed instructions and information regarding the task. They completed the EEfRT for 30 
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minutes as part of a larger battery of tasks that took approximately two hours in total. After all 
tasks were completed, participants received course credits for their participation.  
Study 2 
Participants  
Participants consisted of 122 (55% female) community members recruited from an ad on 
Craigslist; the ad specified that after an initial over-the-phone interview, those who qualified 
would be invited to the lab for a 4 hour study and be compensated $100 with the opportunity to 
win as much as an additional $12 for completing a series of tasks. The sample included 90 
individuals currently experiencing a major depressive episode and 32 healthy controls. 
Individuals diagnosed with a psychotic disorder or who have ever had a manic episode were 
excluded due to differences in reward referencing not caused by a depressive episode. The mean 
participant age was 33.7 years. In total, 55.0% of participants were white, 22.5% were African 
American, 15.8% were Asian, 2.5% were Pacific Islander, 0.8% were Native American or Native 
Alaskan, and 3.7% identified as some other racial group; 12.4% of participants identified as 
Hispanic.  
Participants were excluded if they did not complete at least 50% of the trials (n = 2 in the 
depressed group, n = 1 in the control group) or had a trial success rate below 60% across the 
entire experiment (n = 5 in the depressed group, n = 1 in the control group) due to the task being 
designed to have a success rate of approximately 90%. Individual trials were excluded (n = 159) 
if the choice reaction time for the trial was 2.5 standard deviations larger from a given 
participant’s mean reaction time. This left a total of 83 participants in the depression group, 30 




Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology (Clinician-Rated; IDS-C). The IDS-C is a 
30 item, clinician administered assessment. It assesses the severity of depression symptoms and 
addresses all criterion of a major depressive episode specified by the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders - 4th edition (DSM-IV). All questions pertain to the seven days 
prior the assessment, with the exception of weight loss and gain questions, which pertain to the 
prior 14 days. Rush, Gullion, Basco, Jarrett, and Trivedi (1996) demonstrated good internal 
consistency for a sample of healthy controls and adult outpatients with Major Depressive 
Disorder with a Cronbach’s alpha of .94; our sample’s IDS-C total scores also had a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .94. The maximum score possible on the IDS is 84. Individuals who scored between 0 
and 7 were placed into the control group; for comparison, scores at or between 0 and 11 
represent a level of symptomatology consistent with no depression (Rush et al., 1996). 
Individuals who scored at 24 or greater were placed into the depression group. For comparison, 
scores between 24 and 36 indicate moderate levels of depressive severity, scores between 37 and 
46 represent severe depression, and scores 47 or above index very severe (Rush et al., 1996). 
Those who scored at or between 8 and 23 did not qualify to participate in the study. 
Structured Clinical Interview I for DSM-IV-Text Revision: Mood Episodes. The 
Structured Clinical Interview I for DSM-IV-Text Revision (SCID-I; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & 
Williams, 2002) is a semi-structured clinical interview designed to assess the diagnostic criteria 
for disorders listed in the DSM-IV-TR. In this study, we used the Mood Episodes module to 
screen out individuals who met criteria for any current or past manic episodes.  
Procedures 
 The procedure of study 2 was almost identical to those of study 1 with a few exceptions. 
First, participants were grouped according to their depression scores, but they were not informed 
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of their group membership. Second, participants were able to win real money. Before beginning 
the task, participants were informed that three trials would be chosen at random, regardless of 
whether they are successes or failures, and they received the winnings for only those three trials.  
There was no significant difference between the amounts won by individuals in the depressed 
group (M = $5.36, SD = $2.82) and individuals in the control group (M = $4.37, SD = $2.67); 




Chapter 4: Data Analysis 
Study 1 
In four separate Generalized Estimating Equations (GEEs), I examined the dependent 
variables of a) the proportion of hard choices made and b) participants’ reaction time to make 
each choice. For each dependent variable, data across fiscal pairs were analyzed by both the a) 
absolute Difference (i.e., hard – easy reward value) and b) relative Ratio (i.e., hard/easy reward 
value) between reward options as within-subjects factors. Examining pairs by their absolute 
difference assumes that individuals are making valuations between monetary amounts via 
subtraction. Examining pairs by their relative ratio assumes that individuals are making 
valuations between monetary amounts via division. Each GEE also included whether trials were 
in the first or second Half of the experiment to examine how participants may have changed their 
behavior across the experiment. Because not every pair had identical numbers of trials within it, 
we elected to aggregate data over halves of the experiment instead of analyzing data trial by trial. 
Each GEE used a factorial model and an unstructured covariance matrix to analyze the 
data. I used a binomial distribution with a logit link function for GEEs analyzing the proportion 
of hard choices. For GEEs analyzing reaction times, we used a normal distribution with a 
logarithmic link for reaction times to correct for the significant skewness of 2.96 before 
transformation of absolute differences and 2.87 before transformation of relative ratios of these 
data. Participant number was the subject factor.   
Significant results were followed up by sequential Sidak comparisons for each individual 
monetary pair to control Type I error. Half x Difference and Half X Ratio interactions were only 
compared by different monetary pairs within a specific half of the experiment and the same pair 




To ensure that no single value was associated with excessively high or low choices of the 
easy or hard task, I examined the Easy x Hard value interaction in a Generalized Estimating 
Equation (GEE) with the proportion of hard choices made as the dependent variable. As 
displayed in Table 1, there was a significant interaction effect of easy choice value and hard 
choice value, Wald χ²(3) = 13.4, p = .004. This substantially qualified the main effects of easy 
choice value, Wald χ²(3) = 45.3, p < .001 and hard choice value, Wald χ²(3) = 49.0, p < .001. The 
observed pattern of results suggests that that no one monetary value is driving participants’ 
choices. 
Absolute Difference 
Choices. There was a significant Difference x Half interaction, Wald χ²(6) = 32.3, p > 
.001. This substantially qualified the main effects of absolute differences, Wald χ²(6) = 64.6, p < 
.001, and half of the experiment, Wald χ²(1) = 36.8, p < .001. The relevant pairwise comparisons 
with a sequential Sidak adjustment are represented in Figure 1; significant differences among 
means are detailed below. 
In the first half of the experiment, the hard task was chosen less often with pairs differing 
by $0.50 than pairs differing by $1.50, and $2.50, and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 16.6, ps < .005. The 
hard task was chosen less often during pairs differing by $1.00 than pairs differing by $1.50, and 
$2.50 and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 13.9, ps < .010. Unexpectedly, the hard task was chosen more 
often during pairs differing by $1.50 than those differing by $2.00, Wald χ²(1) = 11.1, p = .03. 
The hard task was chosen less often during pairs that differed by $2.00 than pairs that differed by 
$3.00 and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 13.7, ps < .019.  
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 In the second half of the experiment, the hard task was chosen less frequently in pairs 
that differed by $0.50 and $1.00 than in pairs that differed by $3.50, Wald χ²(1)s > 11.6, ps < 
.046. When comparing the same absolute differences across halves of the experiment, the hard 
task was chosen more frequently in pairs that differed by $1.50, first half of the experiment 
compared to the second half of the experiment, Wald χ²(1)s = 33.8 ps < .001. 
 
Figure 1. Choices of undergraduates by absolute differences. Absolute differences not sharing a 
common letter within a half represents a significant difference of choices. Asterisks denote 
significant differences between halves at a specific absolute difference. 
Reaction time. There were significant main effects of Difference, Wald χ²(6) = 26.7, p < 
.001, and Half, Wald χ²(1) = 45.0, p < .001, on choice reaction time. However, there was no 
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Difference x Half interaction, Wald χ²(6) = 7.00, p = .321. The pairwise comparisons with a 
sequential Sidak adjustment of these results are displayed in Figure 2 and summarized below. 
Throughout the entire experiment, reaction times of choosing either the easy or hard task 
were faster for pairs that differed by $3.00 than pairs that differed by $0.50 and $1.00, Wald 
χ²(1)s > 9.5, ps < .04. Additionally, pairs in the second half of the experiment were chosen faster 
than pairs in the first of the experiment, Wald χ²(1)s > 54.3, p < .001. 
 
Figure 2. Reaction times of undergraduates by absolute differences. Absolute differences not 
sharing a common letter represent a significant difference of choices. The asterisk denotes a 
significant difference between halves. 
Choices. There was a significant Ratio x Half interaction, Wald χ²(6) = 29.7, p < .001, 
which substantially qualified the main effects of relative Ratio, Wald χ²(6) = 66.9, p < .001, and 
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Half of the experiment, Wald χ²(1) = 38.7, p = .001. The relevant pairwise comparisons with a 
sequential Sidak adjustment are represented in Figure 3 and summarized below. 
 In the first half of the experiment, the hard task was chosen less often with pairs that had 
ratios of 1.33 than pairs that had ratios of 2.67 and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 12.8, ps < .02. The hard 
task was chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 1.50 than pairs that had ratios of 2.00 and 
more, Wald χ²(1)s > 11.9, ps < .02. The hard task was chosen less often with pairs that had a 
ratio of 2.00 than pairs that had ratios of 2.67, 4.00, and 8.00, Wald χ²(1)s > 25.0, ps < .001. The 
hard task was chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 3.00 than pairs that had ratios of 4.00 
Wald χ²(1)s > 15.1, p = .004.  
In the second half of the experiment, the hard task was chosen less often with pairs that 
had ratios of 1.33, 1.50, and 2.00 than pairs that had ratios of 2.67 and 8.00, Wald χ²(1)s > 18.4, 
ps < .001. Although unexpected, the hard task was chosen more often with pairs that had ratios 
of 2.67 than pairs that had ratios of 3.00 and 4 Wald χ²(1)s > 11.8, ps < .031.The hard task was 
chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 3.00 than pairs that had ratios of 8.00, Wald χ²(1)s 
= 11.5, p = .024.  
Across halves of the experiment, the hard task was chosen more often with pairs that had 
ratios of 2.00, 3.00, and 4.00 in their first-half appearances compared to their second-half 




Figure 3. Choices of undergraduates by relative ratio. Relative ratios not sharing a common letter 
within a half represents a significant difference of choices. Asterisks denote significant 
differences between halves at a specific relative ratio. 
Reaction time. There was a significant Ratio x Half interaction, Wald χ²(6) = 12.8, p = 
.046, which substantially qualified the main effects of relative Ratio, Wald χ²(6) = 36.3, p < .001, 
and Half of the experiment, Wald χ²(1) = 52.6, p < .001. The relevant pairwise comparisons with 
a sequential Sidak adjustment are represented in Figure 4 and summarized below. 
In the first half of the experiment, pairs with ratios of 1.33 were chosen faster than pairs with 
ratios of 3.00 and 4.00, Wald χ²(1)s > 19.6, ps < .002. There were no significant differences 
among ratios in the second half of the experiment, Wald χ²(1)s < 6.06, ps > .002. Across halves 
of the experiment, reaction times for choosing either the easy or hard task were faster for pairs 
23 
	
with ratios of 2.00, 2.67, 3.00, and 4.00 in the second half of the experiment than the first half, 
Wald χ²(1)s > 20.3, ps < .002. 
 
Figure 4. Reaction times of undergraduates by relative ratio. Relative ratios not sharing a 
common letter in the first half represents a significant difference of choices. Asterisks denote 
significant differences between halves at a specific relative ratio. 
Study 2 
In four separate Generalized Estimating Equations (GEEs), I examined the dependent 
variables of a) the proportion of hard choices made and b) participants’ reaction time to make 
each choice. For each dependent variable, data across fiscal pairs were analyzed by both the a) 
absolute Difference (i.e., hard – easy reward value) and b) relative Ratio (i.e., hard/easy reward 
value) between reward options as within-subjects factors. Examining pairs by their absolute 
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difference assumes that individuals are making valuations between monetary amounts via 
subtraction. Examining pairs by their relative ratio assumes that individuals are making 
valuations between monetary amounts via division, which is a more complex mental operation 
and may be influenced by more of the biases listed above (e.g., the whole-number bias). Each 
GEE also included a) the group that each participant was categorized (depressed or control) to 
identify differences between depressed and typical reward processing and b) trials were in the 
first or second Half of the experiment to examine how participants may have changed their 
behavior across the experiment. Because not every pair had identical numbers of trials within it, 
we elected to aggregate data over halves of the experiment instead of analyzing data trial by trial. 
Each GEE used a factorial model and an unstructured covariance matrix to analyze the 
data. We used a binomial distribution with a logit link function for GEEs analyzing the 
proportion of hard choices. For GEEs analyzing reaction times, we used a normal distribution 
with a logarithmic link for reaction times to correct for the significant skewness of 3.19 before 
transformation of absolute differences and 3.41 before transformation of relative ratios of these 
data. Participant number was the subject factor.   
Significant results were followed up by sequential Sidak comparisons for each individual 
monetary pair to control Type I error. Group x Difference, Group x Ratio, Group x Half, Half x 
Difference, and Half X Ratio interactions were only compared by different monetary pairs within 
a specific half of the experiment and the same pair across halves of the experiment. A target α 
level of .05 was used for all analyses. 
Preliminary Analyses 
To ensure that no single value was associated with excessively high or low choices of the 
easy or hard task, I examined the Easy x Hard value interaction in a Generalized Estimating 
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Equation (GEE) with the proportion of hard choices made as the dependent variable. As 
displayed in Table 2, there was a significant interaction effect of easy choice value and hard 
choice value, Wald χ²(3) = 15.0, p = .002. This substantially qualified the main effects of easy 
choice value Wald χ²(3) = 91.9, p < .001, and hard choice value Wald χ²(3) = 72.4, p < .001. 
However, this pattern was similar across groups, Easy Value x Hard Value x Group Wald χ²(3) = 
4.26, p = .235. The observed pattern of results suggests that although participants chose the 
$4.00 value more frequently than other values, it was not to such a degree that it deterred them 
from choosing other values. 
Absolute Difference 
Choices: Difference x Half. There was a significant Difference x Half interaction, Wald 
χ²(6) = 13.1, p = .042. This substantially qualified the main effect of absolute difference, Wald 
χ²(6) = 153, p < .001; there was no main effect of experiment half on the choice of easy versus 
hard trial, Wald χ²(1) = 0.83, p = .361. The relevant pairwise comparisons with a sequential 
Sidak adjustment are represented in Figure 5 significant differences among means are detailed 
below. 
In the first half of the experiment, the hard task was chosen less often with pairs differing 
by $0.50 than all other pairs, Wald χ²(1)s > 35.0, ps < .002. The hard task was chosen less often 
during pairs differing by $1.00 than pairs differing by $1.50, $2.50 and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 25.7, 
ps < .002. Surprisingly, the hard task was chosen more often during pairs differing by $1.50 than 
those differing by $2.00, Wald χ²(1) = 9.35, p = .003. The hard task was chosen less often during 
pairs differing by $1.50 than those differing by $3.50, Wald χ²(1) = 28.4, p = .003.The hard task 
was chosen less often during pairs that differed by $2.00 than pairs that differed by $2.50 and 
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more, Wald χ²(1)s > 13.8, p = .002. The hard task was chosen less often during pairs differing by 
$2.50 and $3.00 than those differing by $3.50, Wald χ²(1)s < 16.1, ps > .003.  
 In the second half of the experiment, the hard task was chosen less frequently in pairs 
that differed by $0.50 than all other pairs, Wald χ²(1)s > 14.2, ps < .003. The hard task was 
chosen less frequently in pairs that differed by $1.00 compared to those that differed by $1.50 or 
more, Wald χ²(1)s > 13.4, ps < .003. The hard task was chosen less frequently in pairs that 
differed by $1.50 compared to those that differed by $2.50 and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 9.25, ps < 
.004. The hard task was chosen less frequently in pairs that differed by $2.00 compared to those 
that differed by $2.50 or more, Wald χ²(1)s > 20.3, ps < .003. The hard task was chosen less 
frequently in pairs that differed by $2.50 compared to those that differed by $3.50, Wald χ²(1) = 
10.8, p = .003.  
Choices: Difference x Group. There was also a significant Difference x Group 
interaction, Wald χ²(6) = 21.1, p = .002. This substantially qualified the main effects of absolute 
differences, Wald χ²(6) = 153, p < .001; there was no main effect of group, Wald χ²(1) = 1.84, p 
= .175. The relevant pairwise comparisons with a sequential Sidak adjustment are represented in 
Figure 5; significant differences among means are detailed below. 
For individuals in the depressed group, the hard task was chosen less often with pairs 
differing by $0.50 than all other pairs, Wald χ²(1)s > 41.1, ps < .002. The hard task was chosen 
less often during pairs differing by $1.00 than pairs differing by $1.50 and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 
20.4, ps < .003. The hard task was chosen less often during pairs differing by $1.50 than those 
differing by $2.50 and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 11.5, ps < .004. The hard task was chosen less often 
during pairs that differed by $2.00 than pairs that differed by $2.50 and greater, Wald χ²(1)s > 
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13.1, ps < .003. The hard task was chosen less often during pairs differing by $2.50 and $3.00 
than those differing by $3.50, Wald χ²(1)s > 8.3, ps < .004.  
For individuals in the control group, the hard task was chosen less frequently in pairs that 
differed by $0.50 than all other pairs, Wald χ²(1)s > 14.4, ps < .003. The hard task was chosen 
less frequently in pairs that differed by $1.00 compared to those that differed by all pairs except 
$2.00, Wald χ²(1)s > 27.2, ps < .002. Surprisingly, the hard task was chosen more frequently in 
pairs that differed by $1.50 compared to those that differed by $2.00, Wald χ²(1) = 11.2, p = 
.003. The hard task was chosen less frequently in pairs that differed by $1.50 compared to those 
that differed by $3.50, Wald χ²(1) = 18.5, p = .003.The hard task was chosen less frequently in 
pairs that differed by $2.00 compared to those that differed by $2.50 or more, Wald χ²(1)s > 
20.1, ps < .002. The hard task was chosen less frequently in pairs that differed by $2.50 





 Figure 5. Choices of depressed and control participants by absolute difference. Absolute 
differences not sharing a common uppercase letter represents a significant difference of choices 
within the first half. Absolute differences not sharing a common lowercase letter represents a 
significant difference of choices within the second half. Absolute differences not sharing a 
common number represents a significant difference of choices within the corresponding color’s 
group.  
Reaction time. There was a significant Difference x Half interaction, Wald χ²(6) = 26. 9, 
p < .001. This substantially qualified the main effects of absolute differences, Wald χ²(6) = 31.8, 
p < .001 and experiment half, Wald χ²(1) = 6.33, p = .012. There were no interactions involving 
or main effects of group, Wald χ²s < 9.81, ps > .133. The relevant pairwise comparisons with a 
sequential Sidak adjustment are represented in Figure 6; significant differences among means are 
detailed below.  
In the second half of the experiment, reaction times for choosing either the easy or hard 
task were faster for pairs that differed by $0.50 than pairs that differed by $3.50, Wald χ²(1) = 
16.6, p = .004. Reaction times for choosing either the easy or hard task were faster for pairs that 
differed by $1.00 than pairs that differed by $3.50, Wald χ²(1) = 13.1, p = .023. Across halves of 
the experiment, pairs that differed by $0.50 were chosen slower in the first half of the experiment 




Figure 6. Reaction times of depressed and control participants by absolute difference. Absolute 
differences not sharing a common uppercase letter represents a significant difference of reaction 
times within the first half. Absolute differences not sharing a common lowercase letter represents 
a significant difference of reaction times within the second half. Asterisks denote significant 
differences between halves at a specific absolute difference. 
Relative Ratio 
Choices. There was a significant Ratio x Group interaction, Wald χ²(6) = 18.17, p = .006, 
which substantially qualified the main effect of relative Ratio, Wald χ²(6) = 132.8, p < .001;  
there was no significant main effect of Group, Wald χ²(6) = 1.73, p = .188. There were no 
significant interactions involving or main effects of experiment half, Wald χ²s < 6.55, ps > .365. 
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The relevant pairwise comparisons with a sequential Sidak adjustment are represented in Figure 
7 and summarized below. 
Across groups, individuals in the depressed group chose the hard task for pairs that 
differed by 1.33 more often than those who were in the control group, Wald χ²(1) = 17.3, p = 
.003. In the depressed group, the hard task was chosen more often with pairs that had ratios of 
1.33 than pairs that had ratios of 1.50, Wald χ²(1)s > 8.56, ps < .004. The hard task was chosen 
less often with pairs that had ratios of 1.33 than pairs that had ratios of 2.00 and greater, Wald 
χ²(1)s > 20.6, ps < .003. The hard task was chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 1.50 
than all other pairs, Wald χ²(1)s > 52.9, ps < .002. The hard task was chosen less often with pairs 
that had a ratio of 2.00 than pairs that had ratios of 2.67, 4.00, and 8.00, Wald χ²(1)s > 48.6, ps < 
.002. Although unexpected, the hard task was chosen more often with pairs that had ratios of 
2.67 than pairs that had ratios of 3.00 and 4.00, Wald χ²(1)s > 15.2, ps < .003. The hard task was 
chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 2.67 than pairs that had ratios of 8.00, Wald χ²(1) = 
8.87, p = .004.The hard task was chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 3.00 than pairs 
that had ratios of 4.00 and greater Wald χ²(1)s > 33.5, ps < .002. The hard task was chosen less 
often with pairs that had ratios of 4.00 than pairs that had ratios of 8.00, Wald χ²(1) = 48.2, p = 
.002.  
In the control group, the hard task was chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 1.33 
than pairs that had ratios of 2.00 and more, Wald χ²(1)s > 12.8, ps < .003. The hard task was 
chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 1.50 than pairs that had ratios of 2.00 and more, 
Wald χ²(1)s > 12.1, ps < .004. The hard task was chosen less often with pairs that had a ratio of 
2.00 than pairs that had ratios of 2.67, 4.00, and 8.00, Wald χ²(1)s > 45.1, ps < .002. Although 
unexpected, the hard task was chosen more often with pairs that had ratios of 2.67 than pairs that 
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had ratios of 3.00, Wald χ²(1) = 18.3, p = .003. The hard task was chosen less often with pairs 
that had ratios of 2.67 than pairs that had ratios of 8.00, Wald χ²(1) = 9.90, p = .004. The hard 
task was chosen less often with pairs that had ratios of 3.00 than pairs that had ratios of 4.00 and 
greater, Wald χ²(1)s > 33.5, ps < .002. The hard task was chosen less often with pairs that had 
ratios of 4.00 than pairs that had ratios of 8.00, Wald χ²(1) = 33.5, p < .001. 
 
Figure 7. Choices of depressed and control participants by relative ratio. Relative ratios not 
sharing a common number represents a significant difference of choices within the 
corresponding color’s group. Asterisks denote significant differences between halves at a 
specific relative ratio. 
Reaction time. There was a significant Ratio x Half interaction, Wald χ²(6) = 23.0, p = 
.001, which substantially qualified the main effect of relative Ratio, Wald χ²(6) = 40.79, p < .001 
and experiment half, χ²(1) = 9.44, p = .002. There were no interactions involving or main effects 
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of group, Wald χ²s < 2.04, ps > .153. The relevant pairwise comparisons with a sequential Sidak 
adjustment are represented in Figure 8 and summarized below.  
There were no significant differences in reaction times among ratios in the first half of 
the experiment, Wald χ²(1)s > 6.06, ps < .002. In the second half of the experiment, pairs with 
ratios of 1.33 and 1.50 were chosen faster than pairs with ratios of 8.00, Wald χ²(1)s > 12.5, ps < 
.033. 
 
Figure 8. Reaction times of depressed and control participants by relative ratio. Relative ratios 
not sharing a common uppercase letter represents a significant difference of reaction times 
within the first half. Absolute differences not sharing a common lowercase letter represents a 
significant difference of reaction times within the second half.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
The current studies examined reward preferences in three different populations: 
undergraduate students from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas; community members 
experiencing a major depressive episode; and community members not experiencing a major 
depressive episode. In Study 1, undergraduate students demonstrated a greater willingness to 
work harder for imaginary monetary rewards in the first half of the experiment than in the second 
half of the experiment. Contrary to my hypothesis, participants displayed nonmonotonic reward 
preferences by overvaluing monetary pairs that had an absolute difference of $1.50 or a relative 
difference of 2.67. In the second half of the experiment, participants corrected their 
overvaluation of pairs that differed by $1.50 to assume a roughly monotonic reward preference 
pattern. Although participants were able to correct their overvaluation for absolute differences, 
their overvaluation of pairs that had a ratio of 2.67 persisted throughout the entire experiment.  
 In Study 2, community members demonstrated a similar pattern of results as the 
undergraduate sample, which suggests the observed nonmonotonic reward preferences were not 
type I error. Community members as a whole were more willing to work harder for real 
monetary rewards in the first half of the experiment compared to the second half when the 
monetary pairs were examined by their absolute difference. This effect was not present when 
pairs were examined by their relative ratio. Community members who were not experiencing a 
major depressive episode also overvalued absolute differences of $1.50 and relative ratios of 
2.67; these overvaluations persisted across both halves of the experiment. Those experiencing a 
major depressive episode overvalued monetary pairs with a relative ratio of 2.67 throughout the 
experiment, but they demonstrated monotonic preferences when the pairs were examined by 
their absolute differences. Although surprising and counter to my hypothesis, community 
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members experiencing a depressive episode were more willing to work harder for monetary pairs 
that had a relative ratio of 1.33 than the control group.   
Numerical Reasoning while Working for Reward 
 Overall, participants were willing to work harder when the potential reward was real 
money (M = .51, SD = .30) rather than imaginary money (M = .37, SD = .32), t(175) = 3.00, p = 
.003. This became more apparent as the discrepancy in reward value within pairs became larger. 
In addition, participants spent more time making a decision when the potential reward was real 
money (M = 1809 ms, SD = 917.1) rather than imaginary money (M = 1437 ms, SD = 1019), 
t(175) = 2.50, p = .013. Although previous literature did not examine the initial valuation of real 
versus imaginary rewards, my findings are somewhat consistent with existing research 
demonstrating that imaginary rewards consistently elicit a similar pattern but an overall lower 
level of wanting after reward discounting compared to real rewards (Johnson & Bickel, 2002). 
Miyapuram, Tobler, Gregorios-Pippas, and Schultz (2012) found that individuals rate real and 
imaginary rewards as equally pleasant, but the current study suggests that this does not indicate 
that they are willing to exert the same level of effort for both types of rewards. Hübner and 
Schlösser (2010) observed a similar pattern of behavior in which participants were willing to 
work harder if they received monetary rewards were contingent on their performance (as our 
community participants did) rather than receiving a flat payment for simply being part of a study 
(as our undergraduate participants did for their participation credits). This is further supported by 
individuals’ increased level of effort in occupational fields when payment is contingent on 
performance (Goldsmith, Veum, & Darity, 2000).  
When examining monetary pairs by their relative ratios, all groups of participants 
throughout the entirety of both studies overvalued pairs with ratios of 2.67. This may be 
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explained by the difficulty individuals have mentally computing fractions. Unlike integer and 
decimal values, fractions are not automatically processed and require mental effort to manipulate 
into a value that is more easily processed (Bonato, Fabbri, Umiltà, & Zorzi, 2007). Fractions also 
are more difficult for individuals to manipulate in working memory than other types of numerical 
values (Iuculano & Butterworth, 2011). In fact, even when fractions are explicitly mentally 
manipulated, they are prone to more errors in value computation than other types of numbers 
(DeWolf, Grounds, Bassok, & Holyoak, 2014). A potential explanation for the overvaluation of 
the 2.67 ratio is the tendency for individuals to give greater attention to the numerator of a 
fraction than they do to the denominator. Individuals who focus more on the numerator of a 
fraction tend to make mistakes consistent with the whole number bias, such as comparing only 
one component of a fraction (Hurst & Cordes, 2016). This would explain why participants chose 
pairs with the ratio of 2.67 ($4.00 vs. $1.50) with similar frequency as pairs with ratios of 4.00 
($4.00 vs. $1.00) and 8.00 ($4.00 vs. $0.50) but did not overvalue ratios of 3.00 ($1.50 vs. 
$0.50). These findings suggest that the same monetary amount will not always be valued 
identically in different situations; instead, a monetary amount’s value is affected by other 
available rewards. This is further supported by participants’ approximately monotonic valuing of 
pairs with a ratio of 1.33 ($2.00 vs. $1.50) and pairs with a ratio of 1.50 ($1.50 vs. $1.00). 
 In both studies, participants demonstrated quicker decision when choosing either the easy 
or the hard task in second half of the experiment compared to the first half. This is most likely 
due to participants becoming aware of the available monetary pairs. Surprisingly, participants 
took longer to choose between the easy and hard task as the absolute difference or relative ratio 
became larger. This is probably due to participants defaulting to the easy task unless they are 
provided with a large enough discrepancy between the two amounts. Therefore it is likely that 
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participants spend extra time contemplating whether the increased effort is worth the monetary 
amount that can be obtained through the hard task. Although there is no previous research 
supporting this notion, it is difficult to argue that individuals would default to choosing the hard 
task without first examining the possible rewards.  
Some of the difficulties involving basic mathematics may abate over time. Repeated 
exposure to the same math equations leads to a lesser error rate (Charness & Campbell, 1988). 
This may explain why participants in study 1 overvalued differences of $1.50 in the first half of 
the experiment, but then corrected their reward preferences to be roughly monotonic in the 
second half. This is further supported by depressed participants in study 2 also correcting their 
overvaluation of pairs with differences of $1.50 in the second half of the experiment. 
Unexpectedly, non-depressed participants in study 2 persisted in overvaluing pairs with 
differences of $1.50 throughout the entire experiment, suggesting that working for monetary 
rewards may cause continued overvaluation of this particular difference in non-depressed 
populations.  
Depressive Realism and Elevated Wanting 
It is difficult to explain why community members experiencing a major depressive 
episode demonstrated a monotonic reward preference when examining the absolute difference of 
pairs in the second half of the experiment while community members in the control group 
overvalued differences of $1.50 throughout the entire experiment. Previous research has found 
varying results regarding math performance between depressed and non-depressed individuals. 
Warren et al. (1984) observed no difference in performance on a mental mathematical task 
between depressed and non-depressed individuals while Marcotte, Lévesque, and Fortin (2006) 
found that individuals with depression performed worse in math classes. 
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Indeed, my study provides two pieces of evidence for the first demonstration of 
depressive realism in mathematically tractable effort-based decision making. Individuals with 
depression were more likely to work harder for monetary pairs with a ratio of 1.33. Additionally, 
corrected their reward preferences of absolute differences to a monotonic pattern in the second of 
the experiment while controls persisted with overvaluing pairs. However, depression is not 
always associated with performing in similar or superior ways to controls: High school students 
with depressive symptomatology performed worse in their math classes than students who did 
not display depressive symptomatology (Marcotte, Lévesque, & Fortin, 2006). This finding may 
be a consequence of the higher stakes of the evaluation in these classes along with the need to 
exert effort over the course of months rather than minutes, as in our study.  
Contrary to the findings of Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, and Zald (2012) that 
demonstrated individuals with MDD were less sensitive to rewards, individuals experiencing a 
depressive episode in our study showed greater sensitivity to rewards by choosing the hard task 
of the smallest absolute difference and relative ratio pairs more frequently than controls. A 
possible explanation for this contradiction is the differences in study design. Treadway et al. 
(2012) used varying amounts of rewards rather than ten fixed pairs. The easy task could be 
chosen for one dollar while the hard task varied from $1.24 to $4.30. These widely varying 
amounts prevented participants from creating decision-making strategies relative to other 
possible rewards and elicited a “gut level” response rather than a calculated and reasoned 
response. Additionally, Treadway et al. (2012) informed participants of the probability that they 
would actually receive the money if they successfully completed a given trial. This design was 
intended to engage the dopaminergic system through its sensitivity to probability and 
uncertainty. Rewards involving uncertainty are associated with longer lasting dopaminergic 
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responses and individuals with greater responses are more likely to work harder for low-
probability rewards (Abler, Herrnberger, & Spitzer, 2009; Treadway et al., 2012). 
Activity in the dopaminergic system increases when wanting a reward; the greater the 
release of dopamine, the more an individual is likely to report higher levels of wanting 
(Treadway, Buckholtz, Schwartzman, Lambert, & Zald, 2009; Treadway et al., 2012). However, 
the probability of receiving a reward also modulates dopaminergic activity. Specifically, 
dopamine is released only on trials in which receipt of reward is uncertain (Abler, Herrnberger, 
Grön, & Spitzer, 2009; Niv, Duff, & Dayan, 2005; Linnet et al., 2012).  However, in my study, 
rewards were given with 100% certainty after successful trials and allowed participants to 
perform cost-benefit analyses for effort-based reward decision-making. Therefore, my findings 
suggest that uncertainty may be driving the apparent deficits in wanting in Treadway et al.’s 
(2012) behavioral findings. In summary, it does not appear that individuals with depression have 
fundamental deficits in wanting. Instead, only tasks that strongly stimulate the dopaminergic 
system, such as those with high levels of uncertainty, produce an apparent deficit.   
Not engaging the dopaminergic system as strongly in the current study may also partially 
explain the depressed group’s willingness to work harder for reward. Marcotte, Lévesque, and 
Fortin (2006) found that individuals with depression performed worse in their math class than 
their non-depressed peers. This study likely engaged the dopaminergic system due to the 
uncertainty of the points and grades that they would receive on each exam over the course of an 
entire semester. As previously mentioned, Warren et al. (1984) found no difference between 
depressed and non-depressed individuals’ performance on a math test administered in a 
laboratory. This situation is unlikely to engage the dopaminergic system due to the lack of 
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uncertainty of the task; regardless of individuals’ performance, it did not influence their 
compensation for participating.  
My findings may have implications for the treatment of depression. For example, 
behavioral activation is a prevalent therapeutic technique that attempts to help individuals with 
depression address symptoms of decreased levels of energy and anhedonia (Soucy Chartier & 
Provencher, 2013). In light of the findings that individuals with depression do not have 
fundamental deficits in wanting (and are more willing to work for smaller relative rewards than 
controls), using small rewards to guide behavioral activation treatment could prove successful.  
Treatment may also benefit from the approach of depressive realism that was supported in my 
study. Individuals may be more likely to comply with smaller, more realistic behavioral changes.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 There were several limitations to this study. The differences observed between 
participants being offered imaginary money versus real money are confounded with participants 
being recruited from either an undergraduate study pool or Craigslist. We also did not have 
adequate data regarding participants’ income and social economic status (SES). Individuals with 
a lower SES tend to report more depressive symptoms than those with a higher SES 
(Zimmerman & Katon, 2005). Additionally, we did not include all possible monetary pairs. For 
example, we did not include a pair with the absolute difference of $3.00. Another limitation is 
that we did not include more extreme discrepancies. While it appears that absolute differences 
reached an asymptotic pattern, the frequency of choosing the hard task was still increasing at the 
largest relative ratio of 8.00. In future studies, it would be helpful to assess participants’ 
numeracy as a potential explanation for the observed nonmonotonic reward preference pattern 
across both studies. Another potentially worthwhile future study would be an exploratory 
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examination of moderating factors that explain the discrepancies found in the current study 
associated with decreased levels of energy and difficulty thinking and concentrating in regard to 
depression. 
In summary, despite the assumption that individuals with depression would be less 
willing to work hard for rewards, I found that they were actually more willing. Participants 
frequently overvalued absolute differences of $1.50 and relative ratios of 2.67. Therefore 
researchers should be cautious when examining relative and absolute values because it cannot be 
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